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WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT
INTERSECT: NEW DEFECTS IN THE
DEATH PENALTY
ALEXANDER BUNIN*

INTRODUCTION

Most death penalty schemes in the United States today deter
mine whether a defendant is guilty of capital murder during a sen
tencing hearing. In every other criminal case, a trial determines
guilt, and a sentencing hearing selects a punishment for a guilty
defendant.
The effect of this is that some elements of capital murder are
denied the procedural protections of a trial. Providing a less relia
ble procedure for determining elements of a capital crime is without
any precedent in American law or its common law foundations.
This disparity has been revealed by recent Supreme Court cases dis
tinguishing between the elements of a crime and sentencing factors.
A.

Trial vs. Sentence

A sentencing hearing is fundamentally different from a trial. It
permits evidence that is not admissible to prove guilt. 1 There is no
presumption of innocence. 2 It may be decided by a preponderance
of the evidence. 3 A judge may select the sentence. 4
A trial is restricted by formal rules of evidence and procedure. 5

* Alexander Bunin is the Federal Public Defender for the Districts of Northern
New York and Vermont. He is an adjunct professor at Albany Law School, of Union
University.
1. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,246 (1949) (distinguishing procedures
at trial and sentencing).
2. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (no presumption of innocence
exists at a sentencing hearing).
3. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (burden of "beyond a reason
able doubt" not required).
4. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462-64 (1984) (Sixth Amendment does not
require that a jury select punishment).
5. Williams, 337 U.S. at 246 ("Tribunals passing on the gUilt of a defendant always
have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural limitations.").
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A defendant is presumed innocent. 6 The prosecution must prove
all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 A jury is
required. 8
Elements of a criminal offense are any facts the prosecution
must prove to make a defendant eligible for the highest punishment
set by the legislature. 9 It does not matter how the legislature
chooses to characterize those facts.1° If a fact increases the maxi
mum punishment for a crime, it is an element of that crime.1 1 Each
element must then be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
before a defendant is guilty of the crimeP
It is only the conviction of a crime, which fixes the sentencing
range required by statute. 13 The statutory range is located between
the minimum and maximum sentences for the crime of conviction. 14
Once those parameters are set by the finding of guilt, the selection
of punishment is a choice of sentences within that range. 15 The de
termination of a sentence within the appropriate range can then be
made, without jury participation, and by a mere preponderance of
evidence. 16
For example, Title 18 of the United States Code contains most
of the criminal offenses enacted by the Congress. Each statute is
defined by certain facts. These facts are elements of a crime that
must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a defen
dant may be found guilty. If Congress adds a new fact that in
creases the maximum punishment, then Congress has created a
new, greater crime. That additional fact must be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be guilty of
the greater offense.
6. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (presumption of innocence is a
basic tenet of American trials).
7. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (burden of "beyond a rea
sonable doubt" is required at trial).
8.

[d.

9. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000) (proof of a fact that in
creases the statutory maximum punishment is an element of the crime).
10. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549-50 (2002).
11. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004).
12. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 (portions of a single statute containing escalating statu
tory maximum punishments are separate crimes).
13. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986) (conviction of a crime
sets the statutory range).
14. Harris, 536 U.S. at 549 (the statutory range is between the minimum and max
imum punishments set by the legislature).
15. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2002) ("a specific sentence
within the range authorized by the jury's finding ... ").
16. Id.
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Capital Cases

In a capital case, facts that make a defendant eligible for the
death penalty are elements of the crimeP These capital elements
are called "statutory aggravating circumstances."18 Absent a find
ing of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance by a jury, be
yond a reasonable doubt, the crime of capital murder is not proven
and the death penalty may not be considered. 19
In most death penalty cases, the existence of statutory aggra
vating circumstances is not decided during the guilt phase of trial,
but rather during the sentencing hearing. 20 A capital jury receives
proof of the elements and information for selecting punishment, to
gether at a unitary proceeding.21 Therefore, in most death penalty
jurisdictions, a capital defendant is prosecuted for some elements of
capital murder without the trial protections available even to a per
son charged with a simple misdemeanor.
This manner of bifurcating a capital trial was implemented by
legislatures to answer Eighth Amendment concerns about restrict
ing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and assuring
that those persons could present mitigating evidence. 22 These laws
17. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (A fact that is necessary to make a
defendant eligible for the death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.).
18. [d. (sometimes also called aggravating factors).
19. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) ("[F]or purposes of the
Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee the underlying offense of 'murder' is a distinct,
lesser included offense of 'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances ...."').
20. See 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (1997); 21 U.S.c. § 848 (e) (1996); ALA. CODE § 13A-5
45 (e), (f) (1981); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (G) (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602
(1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2003); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch.
921.141 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2001); 720
ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/9-1 (d) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9a (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4624 (b) (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.3 (1988); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (b) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99
19-101 (1973-2000); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305
line (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 175.554 (2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (IV) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (c) (2002); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-1 (2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (B) (1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2002); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (2003); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2003); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2001). Compare OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2002) with WASH REv. CODE § 10.95.060 (1981).
21. Jones V. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (describing federal capital
sentencing procedures).
22. See Eddings V. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,110 (1982) (capital sentencer must be
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were designed before recent Supreme Court cases applying the def
inition of offense elements to mandatory sentencing factors.23
The issue is not whether bifurcation of a capital trial and the
sentencing hearing is proper. It is. The question is at what point
must the trial end and the sentencing hearing begin? The answer is
that the selection of punishment may be decided once the elements
of the crime have been proven. Yet in most capital cases, the sen
tencing hearing begins before all the elements of capital murder are
decided.
In jurisdictions where statutory aggravating circumstances are
not decided until the sentencing hearing, the following anomaly oc
curs. At the guilt phase, a jury may only convict a defendant of a
crime that is less than capital murder. 24 After conviction of this
lesser crime, the jury then enters a sentencing phase. 25 Only then
are the capital elements decided. 26
The sentencing hearing is not subject to the rules of evidence27
or the presumption of innocence. 28 The jury receives the evidence
of guilt along with other information supporting a death sentence. 29
This other information usually includes the effect on the victim's
family and community,3° predictions of the defendant's future dan
gerousness,31 the defendant's prior uncharged conduct,32 examples
of the defendant's bad character,33 and hearsay,34 none of which is
generally admissible at the guilt phase of the trial.3 5
allowed to consider any relevant mitigating evidence); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
189 (1976) (capital statute must channel the sentencer's discretion).
23. See supra note 20.
24. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110-11.
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (d) ("[r]eturn of special findings").
26. See, e.g., 18 U.s.c. § 3593 (c) ("[p]roof of mitigating and aggravating
factors").
27. Id.; compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (1993) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.3 (1988) (applying rules of evidence).
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3591 (a) ("[a] defendant who has been found guilty
.... ").
29. United States v. Jones, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (describing federal capital
procedures).
30. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (victim impact statements are
admissible at a capital sentencing hearing).
31. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161 (1994) (predictions of a capital
defendant's propensity for future violence are admissible at sentencing).
32. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (prior criminal behavior is
admissible at sentencing hearing).
33. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (character evidence is an
appropriate sentencing consideration).
34. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244-47 (1949).
35. In a trial before verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of hav
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The jury then deliberates upon two very different issues,
whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder and whether a
death sentence is appropriate. 36 Although eligibility for the death
penalty must be decided beyond a reasonable doubt, the selection
of punishment may be decided by a preponderance of evidenceY
Selection may be determined by a judge. 38
By deciding the capital elements at the sentencing hearing, the
defendant does not receive protections provided during the proof
of guilt for any other crime. 39 To the extent that capital elements
are proved, it is a sentencing hearing in name only. Calling it a
sentencing hearing does not resolve the discord caused by deciding
the capital elements without traditional trial protections. Three re
lated areas of law have converged to cause this conflict: the right to
a jury in criminal trials, traditional sentencing law, and modern cap
ital sentencing law. Although these areas overlap, their develop
ment has generally received separate treatment.
I.

THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

Sir William Blackstone warned in the 1760s that jury trials
could be undermined by "new and arbitrary methods of trial" and
that the inconvenience of jury trials was "the price all free nations
must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters. "40 Two hun
dred years later, the United States Supreme Court struck down a
Maine statute for reducing the prosecution's burden of proof in a
ing engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically ac
cused. Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials which
narrowly confine the trial contest to evidence that is strictly relevant to the
particular offense charged. These rules rest in part on a necessity to prevent a
time-consuming and confusing trial of collateral issues. They were also de
signed to prevent tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particu
lar offense from being influenced to convict for that offense by evidence that
the defendant had habitually engaged in other misconduct. A sentencing
judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of
punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.
Id. at 246-47.
36. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999).
37. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002).
38. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 417, 462-63 (1984).
39. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (no presumption of inno
cence at sentencing hearing); Williams, 337 U.S. at 246-47 (no rules of evidence at sen
tencing hearing).
40. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-44
(n.p. 1769).
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murder case. 41 By presuming a defendant acted with premedita
tion, the statute eliminated the necessity for a jury finding of the
mens rea for murder, and infringed upon a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to jury tria1. 42
Two decades later, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of
proving facts that raise the statutory maximum for an offense. In
Jones v. United States ,43 the Court stated that "under the Due Pro
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior con
viction)44 that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. "45
The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court dis
tinguished between offense elements and sentencing factors. 46 Of
fense elements are those facts necessary to subject a defendant to
the statutory punishment range. 47 Sentencing factors direct a sen
tencer to choose punishments within the statutory range. 48
Whether a finding is an offense element or sentencing factor de
pends upon the effect of the inquiry, not how the legislature chose
to characterize the finding. 49 For example, a finding that the crime
was based upon the victim's race, subjecting the defendant to a
higher maximum punishment, is an offense element. 5o On the other
hand, a finding that a defendant brandished a firearm, to establish a
mandatory minimum punishment, is a sentencing factor. 51
41. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) ("[T]he distinction established
by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater importance than the
difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.").
42. [d. at 703-04.
43. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (holding that proof of
serious bodily injury or death for higher maximum punishments were additional offense
elements of carjacking).
44. An exception for prior convictions was stated in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1998) by a 5-4 majority. However, one member of that
majority has since announced his vote was in error, raising the possibility that this ex
ception may someday be extinguished. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520-21
(2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
45. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
46. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
47. Id. at 483.
48. [d. at 494 n.19 ("The term appropriately describes a circumstance, which may
be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within
the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular
offense.")
49. [d. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect ....").
50. [d. at 482-83.
51. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002).
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Although this article is concerned with the effect on capital
cases, particularly in the federal courts, the Supreme Court's ruling
in Apprendi changed the way many crimes are prosecuted. For in
stance, under federal law, possession with intent to distribute 100
grams of heroin has a maximum punishment of forty years impris
onment. 52 Absent proof of at least that quantity of heroin, the
maximum punishment may not exceed twenty years. 53
Before Apprendi, such drug quantities could be found by a
judge relying on a report from a probation officer. 54 Now the issue
must be alleged by indictment and decided by a jury during the guilt
phase of tria1. 55 After Blakely v. Washington, even minor sentenc
ing enhancements may require such treatment. 56 By placing the de
termination of drug quantities during the guilt phase, it is now
subject to both the rules of evidence57 and the presumption of inno
cence. 58 A sentencing hearing lacks these protections. 59
The Supreme Court was then confronted with its previous deci
sions regarding a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. Ten
years before Apprendi, the Court held in Walton v. Arizona that the
aggravating circumstances introduced at a capital sentencing hear
ing were sentencing factors, not offense elements. 6o Dissenting in
Apprendi, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the effect of an aggra
vating circumstance was to make a defendant eligible for the death
penalty. Thus, under the Court's new analysis, an aggravating cir
52. 21 U.S.c. § 841(b)(1)(B) (federal criminal penalties for controlled
substances).
53. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 628 (2002) (drug quantity is an
element of 21 U.S.c. § 841).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) (Presentence Report).
55. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
We conclude, following Apprendi's teachings, that if the type and quantity of
drugs involved in a charged crime may be used to impose a sentence above the
statutory maximum for an indeterminate quantity of drugs, then the type and
quantity of drugs is an element of the offense that must be charged in the
indictment and submitted to the jury.
Id.
56. See United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 73
U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004).
57. FED. R. EVID. 1l01(b) ("These rules apply generally ... to criminal cases and
proceedings. ").
58. Delo V. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) (presumption of innocence exists
during gUilt phase of trial).
59. FED. R. EVID. 1l01(d)(3) ("The rules (other than with respect to privileges)
do not apply in the following situations: ... Proceedings for ... sentencing ....").
60. Walton V. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (citing Poland V. Arizona, 476
U.S. 147, 156 (1986)).
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cumstance would have to be treated as an offense element. 61 Wal
ton, which allowed a judge to make the findings regarding
aggravating circumstances, appeared to be in opposition to Ap
prendi's requirement of a jury verdict.
Two years after Apprendi, the Court overruled Walton in Ring
v. Arizona,62 raising the question of what other ramifications exist
for a capital sentencing hearing that combines proof of elements
and the determination of a sentence. An examination of traditional
sentencing and modern capital sentencing explains why offense ele
ments must belong as part of the guilt phase of a trial and not the
sentencing hearing.
II.

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF SENTENCING

At common law, a judge was required to impose sentences spe
cifically sanctioned by criminal statutes. 63 In other words, punish
ments were mandatory, of which most were death sentences. 64 If a
judge thought a sentence was inappropriate, the judge had to in
voke the pardon process to commute the punishment. 65 Since there
was no range of sentences to choose from, limiting judicial discre
tion was unnecessary. A judge simply had little discretion to
constrain. 66
61. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 537-38 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissent
ing) ("The distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is baffling, to say the
least. ").
62. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
63. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479 (citing LANGBEIN, THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
JURY ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, IN THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND,
FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, 36-37 (A. Schioppa, ed. 1987».
64. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3rd ed. 1982);
see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197-98 (1971) (most common-law
murders required a mandatory death penalty); Justice Antonin Scalia, Sherman J. Bell
wood Lecture, University of Idaho (Sept. 7, 2000), in Alice Koskela, Scalia Shows Tex
tualists Have a Sense of Humor, 43-0CT ADVOC. 31 (2000) ("There was a trial, and
they were either released or hung.").
65. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692-94 (1975).
66. [d. An example of the extreme lengths necessary to avoid injustice was the
"benefit of clergy."
[T]he widespread use of capital punishment was ameliorated further by exten
sion of the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. Almost any person able to read was eligi
ble for "benefit of clergy," a procedural device that effected a transfer from
the secular to the ecclesiastic jurisdiction. And under ecclesiastic law a person
who committed an unlawful homicide was not executed; instead he received a
one-year sentence, had his thumb branded and was required to forfeit has
goods. At the turn of the 16th century, English rulers, concerned with the
accretion of ecclesiastic jurisdiction at the expense of the secular, enacted a
series of statutes eliminating the benefit of clergy in all cases of "murder of
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That system carried over to the Colonies. 67 Punishments were
mostly fines, whippings, stocks, banishment, and the gallows. 68
Originally, the jury did not impose the sentence. 69 Jurors merely
found whether the defendant was guilty of the statute. 70
It was only by the 1820s that prisons became a standard form
of punishment in the United States.71 With the creation of prisons,
judges were given discretion regarding how long a prisoner could be
confined.72 State legislatures and Congress began creating criminal
laws with ranges of punishment.7 3 Legislatures set the minimum
and maximum punishments allowed.7 4 Judicial discretion increased
with devices like probation and indeterminate sentences. 75
Absent mandatory sentencing considerations, a judge has dis
cretion to sentence a defendant anywhere within the statutory
range. 76 This can lead to drastically divergent sentencing policies
among judges even in a single jurisdiction.77 In recent decades, legmalice prepensed." Unlawful homicides that were committed without such
malice were designated "manslaughter,"and their perpetrators remained eligi
ble for the benefit of clergy. 12 Hen. 7, c. 7 (1496); 4 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1512); 23
Hen. 8, c. 1, ss 3, 4 (1531); 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, S 10 (1547).
Id.
67. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 ("[T]he historical foundation for our recognition of
these principles extends down centuries into the common law.").
68. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 112 (Norval
Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
69. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 ("trial by jury, and judgment by court").
70. The practice of jury sentencing arose in this country during the colonial
period for cases not involving capital punishment. It has been suggested that
this was a 'reaction to harsh penalties imposed by judges appointed and con
trolled by the Crown' and a result of 'the early distrust of governmental
power.'
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 200 n.lO (1971) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMIS
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS 26 (1967».
71. ROTHMAN, supra note 68, at 111 ("[A]n idea developed: those convicted of
crimes would be confined behind walls, in single cells, and would follow rigid and un
yielding routines.").
72. Id. at 126 ("[T]he prison sentence was to substitute confinement for
.
executIOn.
. .. ") .
73. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 ("Since the 19th-century shift in this country from
statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion within a
permissible range ....").
74. Id. ("That discretion was bound by the range of sentencing options prescribed
by the legislature.").
75. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1949) (holding that non-judicial
devices such as a probation report may be used by a court in a sentencing decision).
76. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 Uudge has wide discretion within minimum and
maximum punishments).
77. See A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING
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islatures became concerned with further limiting judicial discre
tion.78 Reacting to sentencing diversity, legislatures imposed
greater limitations on judicial discretion in an effort to make sen
tencing more uniform. 79
The new limitations on discretion were in the form of specific
factual considerations affecting the length of sentence. 80 Whether
contained within the charged criminal statute, or referenced in a
separate sentencing law, these considerations came to be known as
sentencing factors. 81 The most dramatic examples of sentencing
factors are mandatory minimum punishments82 and sentencing
guidelines. 83
The appearance of escalating minimum sentences, based upon
a finding of additional facts, has only recently become wide
spread. 84 Quantities of drugs,85 the presence of firearms,86 and
"hate crimes"87 all have been predicates for higher mandatory mini
mum sentences.
Sentencing guidelines are based upon numerical scales that de
fine the seriousness of the offense and the severity of a defendant's
criminal history.88 By adding and subtracting points assigned to va
rious factors, a judge is given a far more limited choice of sentences
than the statutory minimum and maximum. 89 A judge may ignore
these restrictions only for strictly defined reasons. 90
The Supreme Court approved both mandatory-minimum
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (Federal Judicial Center,
No. 74-4 1974).
78. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (sentencing guidelines
mandated by Congress do not violate the separation of powers between the branches of
government).
79. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) ("In the latter part of the
20th century, many legislatures, dissatisfied with sentencing disparities among like of
fenders, implemented measures regulating judicial discretion.").
80. See, e.g., 21 U.S.c. § 841 (2004) (providing mandatory minimum sentences
based upon drug quantities).
81. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19.
82. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79,93 (1986) (approving mandatory mini
mum punishment for possession of a firearm).
83. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367 (discussing federal sentencing guidelines).
84. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (discussing whether a
fact is an element of an offense or a sentencing factor).
85. United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 2001).
86. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 93.
87. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 491-93 (2000).
88. See, e.g., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
89. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5A ("Determining the Sentence").
90. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (known as "departures").
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sentences91 and sentencing guidelines. 92 When sentencing factors
are used to restrict judicial discretion below the statutory maximum
punishment they do not offend the Constitution. 93 However, when
those systems require judges to find facts that increase the maxi
mum sentence, they violate the Sixth Amendment. 94
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the different pro
cedures at trial and sentencing are based upon their different
goals. 95 Therefore, prior to the advent of sentencing factors there
was little reason for any factual findings at a sentencing hearing. 96
Due process did not require trial protections and no jury participa
tion was necessary. 97
III.

THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY

In 1972, the Supreme Court struck down all existing death pen
alty statutes in the United States. 98 Those statutes were found to
violate the Eighth Amendment by giving juries unfettered discre
tion to impose the death penalty.99 Legislatures enacted new death
penalty schemes that attempted to restrict the class of persons eligi
ble for the death penalty and to limit jury discretion.1°o
To comply with the Eighth Amendment, the death penalty
must be proportionate to the offense charged. WI Individual culpa
91. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,567-68 (2002) (explaining judicial find
ing of fact establishing mandatory minimum sentence did not violate defendant's right
to jury trial).
92. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (approving formation of
the United States Sentencing Commission to set sentencing guidelines).
93. Harris, 536 U.S. at 558 ("Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sen
tence within the authorized range does not implicate the indictment, jury-trial, and rea
sonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.").
94. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004).
95. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (contrasting trial and sentenc
ing procedures).
96. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-22 (2003) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence).
97. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490
U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989», overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
98. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
99. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("Because of the uniqueness of the
death penalty, Furman held it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.").
100. See supra note 20.
101. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is
a disproportionate punishment for rape).
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bility for capital murder is required. 102 Certain classes of persons
are completely excluded from the reach of capital punishment. 103
Mandatory death penalty laws are prohibited,104 and the jury must
be allowed to consider mitigating evidence. 105
In order to meet these Eighth Amendment concerns, legisla
tures bifurcated capital jury trials,lo6 The first phase was designed
to determine guilt. 107 If a defendant was convicted, the second
phase decided punishment. 10B By this separation, the guilt phase
maintained all of the protections of a trial. 109 The sentencing hear
ing was to assure that only an eligible defendant received a death
sentence, and that they were able to present any evidence that miti
gated against death. llo In general, prosecutors were given the same
freedom from the rules of evidence. 1ll
At the time these laws were enacted, a jury was allowed to
consider imposing a death sentence as long as the criminal statute
had a maximum punishment of death.1l2 Statutory aggravating fac
tors merely were considered sentencing factors, not offense
elements. l13
The Supreme Court did not require any specific model for the
102. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding that the death penalty
requires at least a "reckless indifference to human life").
103. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (mentally retarded persons);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (persons less than sixteen years old); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (insane persons).
104. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that the
mandatory death sentence for first degree murder violated the Eighth Amendment).
105. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-08 (1978) (holding that a procedure that
failed to consider a defendant's lack of specific intent to commit murder violated Eighth
Amendment).
106. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988) (comparing various
state schemes).
107. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1976).
108. Id. (explaining that a gUilty verdict is followed by a separate evidentiary
hearing to determine sentence).
109. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) ("So long as the evidence
introduced and the arguments made at the pre-sentence hearing do not prejudice a
defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions.").
110. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967,971-73 (1994) (describing capital proce
dures consistent with Eighth Amendment).
111. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593 (c) (2000) ("Information is admissible regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials
except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."); cf
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (4) (1993) (requiring that the rules of evidence apply to
proof of aggravating factors).
112. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
113. Id.
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new capital punishment schemes. 114 Most procedures restricted eli
gibility for the death penalty during the sentencing phase after ag
gravating factors were proven. 1IS Subsequently, if proven, the
death penalty, or some lesser sentence, could be selected. 116
The Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury select the
punishment. 1l7 As long as a jury finds all the elements of capital
murder beyond a reasonable doubt, a judge may choose between
death and lesser sentences.1 18 However, instead of requiring proof
of all elements of the offense at a trial, many capital schemes left
proof of aggravating circumstances until the sentencing hearing.1 19
In those schemes, the jury must participate as fact finders during
the punishment hearing to find the existence of at least one statu
tory aggravating circumstance po

IV.

A

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Until recently, there did not appear to be a conflict between
traditional sentencing law, modern capital sentencing procedure,
and the right to a jury trial. If a jurisdiction required proof of a fact
during the guilt phase of trial, then that fact received all the protec
tions of the rules of evidence 121 and the presumption of inno
cence.1 22 However, since proof of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance is now considered an element of capital murder,123
then proving that aggravating circumstance during the sentencing
phase needs to be reconciled with the constitutional requirements
of the guilt phase of a trial.
114. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) ("The Eighth Amendment
is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its
sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws. ").
115. See supra note 20.
116. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998) ("[I]n the selection phase,
we have emphasized the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence
to allow an individualized determination.").
117. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 462-63.
118. Id. (holding that a capital sentence may be imposed by a judge).
119. See supra note 20.
120. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77 (1999) (holding that a jury must
find a statutory aggravating circumstance).
121. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949) (holding that the rules of
evidence apply at the guilt phase of a criminal trial).
122. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (holding that a presumption of
innocence applies at the guilt phase of a criminal trial).
123. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003).
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Ring v. Arizona

In Walton v. Arizona,124 the United States Supreme Court ap
proved Arizona's capital punishment scheme allowing a judge to
make the factual findings necessary before a death sentence could
be considered. In Arizona, a judge could determine the existence
of facts narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death pen
alty.125 The supporting rationale of Walton was that the Arizona
legislature had set the maximum statutory range of punishment at
death; therefore, the jury's guilty verdict satisfied the Sixth Amend
ment right to a jury trial. 126 That reasoning was sufficient when the
focus was on how the legislature worded the statute.
The attention has since changed from the words of the statute
to their effect.1 27 The clear effect of the Arizona statute was to
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty only after there was
a finding of at least one fact that narrowed the class of persons eligi
ble for the death penalty.1 28 Although the Apprendi majority at
tempted to distinguish capital findings, by the time of Ring, the
entire Court was convinced of the irreconcilability of the two
cases. 129 Some felt Walton should be overruled 130 and others
wanted to do away with Apprendi.1 31 Ring overruled Walton and
the analysis of Apprendi prevailed. 132
Ring answered the question about the necessity for jury find
ings, but raised other issues. One question raised by Ring was
whether the statutory aggravating circumstances in capital cases are
actually offense elements.133 The Ring Court called statutory ag
gravating circumstances "the functional equivalent of an ele
124. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990).
125. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 594-95 (2002).
126. Id. at 602 (finding that the Arizona legislature gave first degree murder a
maximum sentence of death).
127. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) ("[I]nquiry is not one of
form, but of effect ....").
128. Ring, 536 U.S. at 604.
129. Id. at 609 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and
Thomas, JJ.); id. at 613 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring); id.
at 619-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J. dissenting).
130. Id. at 609 ("Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable ...."); id. at 613 (Ken
nedy, J., concurring) ("Apprendi is now the law ...."); id. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring
in judgment) (relying on the Eighth Amendment).
131. Id. at 619-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Yet in choosing which to overrule,
I would choose Apprendi, not Walton.").
132. Id. at 609 ("Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a
sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary
for imposition of the death penalty.").
133. Id. at 598.
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ment,"134 but it was unclear whether the Court meant there was a
difference between an element and a "functional equivalent," or
whether the Court was simply uncomfortable with referring to
elements.
B.

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania

In Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia, writing for three
members of the Court, stated that before Apprendi and Ring "capi
tal-sentencing procedures were understood to be just that: sentenc
ing proceedings."135 Justice Scalia then explained that until the
elements of the greater offense of capital murder are proven, a de
fendant is only exposed to the underlying lesser offense of mur
der.136 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Scalia in
holding that whether it is called a sentencing hearing or not, the
protections of a trial apply to proving elements of a capital crime.137
The dissent agreed. 138 Justice Ginsberg, writing for Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer stated, "This Court has determined ...
that for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, capital sentencing
proceedings involving proof of one or more aggravating factors are
to be treated as trials of separate offenses, not merely sentencing
proceedings."139 Therefore, seven members of the Supreme Court
clearly stated that statutory aggravating circumstances are elements
of capital murder.1 40
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor did not join in either state
134. Id. ("Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense."') (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
135. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (holding that to bar a
death sentence on retrial, a defendant must be acquitted of capital elements).
136. Id. at 111.
137. Id. This is consistent with Apprendi's rule of looking to the effect of the
finding, and not legislative labels. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
138. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126 n.6 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2004).
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that the aggravating factors necessary for
imposition of the death penalty under Arizona's analogous state death penalty
act were elements of a capital crime, such that they had to be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt in conformity with the reasoning
of Apprendi.
Id. (emphasis added); Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd on
other grounds, 540 U.S. 12 (2003) (recognizing that a majority of the Supreme Court
has reached this view).
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ment. They both dissented in Apprendi. 141 In Ring, Justice Ken
nedy grudgingly accepted Apprendi,142 while Justice O'Connor
continued to reject Apprendi and its progeny.J43 However, they
both apparently believe, despite their objections, that Ring and Sat
tazahn hold that proof of at least one aggravating circumstance is
now treated as an element of capital murder. Therefore, the Court
is unanimous. Like it or not, statutory aggravating circumstances
are capital elements. 144
Every federal court that has reviewed this issue after Sattazahn
has agreed that proof of at least one statutory aggravating circum
stance is necessary to prove a capital crime. 145 Courts have also
applied the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment to federal
capital cases even though the federal capital statutes require only
written notice of the intent to seek the death penalty.146
Before the Supreme Court's decisions in Ring and Sattazahn, it
was possible to say that the relaxed evidentiary standards approved
by the Supreme Court for capital sentencing hearings applied to
statutory aggravating circumstances 147 and that no presumption of
innocence was necessary.148 It is now clear that a defendant is eligi
ble for the death penalty only after he has been convicted of all the
141. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 460, 523-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and Breyer, J.).
142. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
143. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 116-17 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I do not join Part
III, which would further extend the reach of Apprendi ... because I continue to believe
that case was wrongly decided.").
144. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519,2524 (2004) ("Ring held that, because
Arizona's statutory aggravators restricted [as a matter of state law] the class of death
eligible defendants, those aggravators effectively were elements for federal constitu
tional purposes, and so were subject to the procedural requirements the Constitution
attaches to trial of elements.") (emphasis added).
145. See United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 140-41 (2nd Cir. 2004); Esparza v.
Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d
970,974-76 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327, 332-33
(D. Mass. 2003); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 2002);
United States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
146. See Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 978-79; Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 146;
Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1255; Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 332; United States v. Re
gan, 221 F. Supp 2d 672, 674 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d
672, 675 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 478-79 (D. Vt.
2002).
147. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) ("We think desirable for the jury
to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing
decision.").
148. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) ("Once the defendant has been
convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence
disappears.") .
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elements of capital murder, including at least one statutory aggra
vating circumstance. 149 The next question is whether due process
requires that, during proof of those elements, a defendant receive
the protections of the rules of evidence and the presumption of
mnocence.
V.

EFFECT OF RING AND SATTAZAHN

The obvious effect of Ring and Sattazahn is that in many juris
dictions the elements of capital crimes are not addressed until the
sentencing hearing. A review of the practical differences between
the proof of guilt and the determination of punishment demon
strates the irrationality and unconstitutionality of these procedures.
A.

Rules of Evidence

Rules of evidence began to develop in sixteenth century En
gland when judges started admitting oral testimony during jury tri
als. 150 Before that time, verdicts were based on jurors' own
knowledge, with the assistance of legal documents. 151 As one com
mentator described the early development of oral testimony, "the
absence of clear rules as to admissibility of evidence, and as to the
conduct of a trial, were used to give advantages to the crown."152
By the time the Framers began drafting the United States Con
stitution, four exclusionary rules of criminal evidence were firmly in
place in English common law: the character rule, the corroboration
rule, the confession rule, and the hearsay rule. 153 The character rule
prevented the prosecution from introducing evidence of the defen
dant's bad character, especially evidence of former crimes, except
by way of rebuttal. The corroboration rule required evidence in
addition to that of the accomplice in order for the jury to convict.
The confession rule excluded evidence that the accused had made
in an out-of-court confession of the crime, unless the confession was
voluntary. The hearsay rule rejected testimony by one person
about what another person said when that testimony was offered to
prove the truth of the out-of-court statemenU 54
149.
150.

Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2002).
9 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 126 (Methuen
& Co. Ltd. et al. eds., 1926) (1966).
151. !d. at 131.
152. Id. at 224.
153. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGiNS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 179
(Oxford University Press 2003).
154. Id.
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The evolution of these rules has varied. The character rule has
continued to this day.I55 The accomplice rule exists in many states,
but not the federal courts.I 56 The confession rule was made a con
stitutional right.I57 The hearsay rule, as it applies to testimonial evi
dence in a criminal case, also has constitutional protection. 158
The importance, however, is not in what form these rules sur
vive, but in the Framers' understanding of the need for exclusionary
rules of evidence for the protection of criminal defendants. 159 The
creation of such rules occurred shortly before the time the Constitu
tion and the Bill of Rights were born. As the Supreme Court
stated:
Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in
the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Con
stitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our
system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust
convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and
property.I60

The above quote is another way of saying that the rules of evi
dence are essential to protect rights that are specifically stated in
the Constitution. The rules of evidence have a significance similar
to Miranda warnings.I 61 Although Miranda warnings are not them
selves a protection stated in the Constitution, they are necessary to
155. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) ("Courts that follow
the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the
prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a
probability of his guilt.").
156. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917) (no absolute rule
preventing convictions based on the testimony of accomplices).
157. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537-38 (1963) (holding conviction cannot be
based upon coerced confession).
158. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004) (Confrontation Clause
bars statements by unavailable witnesses who were not previously subject to cross
examination).
159. From the standpoint of modern comparative law, what is distinctive
about the Anglo-American law of evidence is its exclusionary character, that
is, its undertaking to deal with suspect classes of proof by excluding the evi
dence from the jury, rather than allowing such weaknesses to affect credit as in
most modern Continental practice.
LANGBEIN, supra note 153, at 250.
160. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (comparing need for
rules of evidence at trial with an evidentiary hearing).
161. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring law enforcement to
warn suspects before taking custodial statements).
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enforce the right against self-incrimination.162
Rules of evidence now apply during the guilt phase in all crimi
nal jury trials. 163 Except for some who commit misdemeanors and
petty offenses, all defendants have the right to jury trials. l64
The rules of evidence are rules of limitation. 165 They restrict
the quality of evidence that a proponent may introduce.1 66 A pros
ecutor is the proponent of evidence when proving elements of a
crime. 167 A criminal defendant is the opponent. Therefore, when a
prosecutor seeks to prove capital elements, the government bene
fits from the absence of rules of evidence, while the defendant suf
fers from their 10ss.1 68 Unlike sentencing rules, rules of evidence do
not merely depend upon a judge's individual sense of fairness. 169
They exclude certain evidence as a matter of law. 170

1.

Relevance

There is a difference in substance between evidence at the guilt
phase of a trial and information presented at a sentencing hear
ing. l7l That distinction can best be viewed through the evidentiary
concept of relevance.1 72 "'Relevant evidence' means evidence hav
ing any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
162. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440-41 n.6 (2000) (holding Consti
tution requires Miranda warnings in order to secure Fifth Amendment rights).
163. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("Tribunals passing on the
guilt of a defendant always have been hedged in by strict evidentiary procedural
limitations. ").
164. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (noting the right to jury trial for
sentences exceeding six months).
165. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 264 (1898) ("This excluding function is the characteristic one in our law
of evidence.").
166. See FED. R. EVID. 103 (rules admit or exclude evidence).
167. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,175 (1987) ("Evidence is placed
before the jury when it satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary
Rules....").
168. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (explaining how sentenc
ing hearing is a less exacting procedure than proof of guilt).
170. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) ("In addition to the histori
cal basis ... there are sound practical reasons for the distinction. ").
171. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) ("Traditionally, sentencing
judges have considered a wide variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt
in determining what sentence to impose on a convicted defendant.").
172. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) (discussing how rele
vance exists as a relation between an item of evidence and the matter to be proven).
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probable than it would be without the evidence."173 Some evidence
is of consequence to guilt and other information relates to punish
ment, but very often the two purposes are exc1usive. 174
For instance, proof of a prior conviction is sometimes an ele
ment of an offenseP5 Prior crimes are also important in deciding
an appropriate punishment. 176 In some situations, a prior convic
tion may be relevant to both phases of a trial.1 77
However, the reverse is not true. Punishment information is
not necessarily relevant to proving guiltP8 Whether or not the de
fendant used illegal drugs is not relevant evidence to prove whether
or not he robbed a bankp9 It makes guilt no more or less proba
ble. The information may have some value when assessing a sen
tence, but it is not relevant to determine whether the defendant
robbed a bank. 180
"[W]here the jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital
trial, many issues that are irrelevant to the guilt-innocence determi
nation step into the foreground and require consideration at the
sentencing phase."181 A great deal of information that is com
pletely acceptable at a sentencing hearing would never be properly
admitted during a trial, capital or noncapital.1 82
Even relevant evidence may unfairly prejudice a jury against a
defendant. 183 Rules of evidence protect criminal defendants from
exposure to certain types of information that have been deemed
173. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Definition of 'Relevant Evidence"').
174. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,401-02 (1999) (finding victim impact
is relevant to selection phase of capital sentencing).
175. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(1) (2000) (felon in possession of a firearm).
176. United States v. Dalhover, 96 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1938) (uncharged rob
beries could be considered at sentencing).
177. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (prior offenses may
trigger sentencing enhancements).
178. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) (traditionally, sentencing
evidence was "largely unlimited"). This case has been superseded by statute as stated
in United States v. Waford, 894 F.2d 665, 667 (4th Cir. 1990), United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d. 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1212
(11th Cir. 1989) (stating that due to the Sentencing Reform Act, judges are no longer
"largely unlimited" in what they may consider when deciding sentence).
179. United States v. Madden, 38 F.3d 747, 752 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do not
believe that evidence of occasional drug use should be admitted; financial need is the
key element to establish motive.").
180. Id. (testimony merely "tars Madden as a drug user in the eyes of the jury").
181. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) (instruction on parole
ineligibility was required to answer argument of future dangerousness).
182. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1,6 (1994) (finding admission of prior death
sentence allowed).
183. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (holding that the iden
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unfairly prejudicial to proving guilt. 184
2.

Character Evidence

Unfair prejudice occurs at a trial when a defendant is harmed
by violations of the rules of evidence. 18s The best example of preju
dicial evidence that has been limited by rule is character evi
dence. 186 The rules of evidence generally prohibit the introduction
of extrinsic acts that might adversely reflect on the actor's charac
ter, unless that evidence bears upon a relevant issue in the case such
as motive, opportunity, or knowledge.187 However, at a sentencing
hearing, virtually all facets of a defendant's character are rele
vant.1 88 Although the defendant's propensity to commit crime is
generally a legitimate sentencing concern, it is prohibited at a
trial.1 89
One exception the Supreme Court has made to the general
prohibition against admitting prior acts is when a statute makes
proof of a prior conviction an element of the offense. 190 However,
proof of the prior conviction at trial is limited to the conviction it
self, not the underlying facts.191 The Court has referred to the ap
plication of the rules of evidence as one of the procedural
tity of defendant's prior felony was unfairly prejudicial when defendant agreed to its
existence ).
184. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 860 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rules
of evidence are also weighted in the defendant's favor. For example, the prosecution
generally cannot introduce evidence of the defendant's character to prove his propen
sity to commit a crime, but the defendant can introduce such reputation evidence to
show his law-abiding nature.").
185. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180-81.
186. See FED. R. EVID. 404 ("Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove Con
duct; Exceptions; Other Crimes").
187. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) ("The threshold in
quiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is
whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.").
188. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976) ("wide scope of evidence").
189. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181 ("Although ... 'propensity evidence' is relevant,
the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged-or that, uncertain of
guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment-creates a preju
dicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance." (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681
F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982»).
190. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 562 (1967) (upholding recidivist statute that
required proof of prior convictions at trial).
191. Id. at 562-63 ("The evidence itself is usually, and in recidivist cases almost
always, of a documentary kind, and in the cases before us there is no claim that its
presentation was in any way inflammatory.").
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safeguards making recidivist statutes constitutional. 192
The exclusion of bad acts evidence is founded not on a belief that
the evidence is irrelevant, but rather on a fear that juries will
tend to give it excessive weight, and on a fundamental sense that
no one should be convicted of a crime based on his or her previ
ous misdeeds. 193

At a trial, "similar acts evidence is to be considered only for
the proper purpose for which it was admitted."194 When that evi
dence is offered merely to prove that the defendant has a bad char
acter, it must be excluded.1 95
Propensity and character evidence are routinely used during a
sentencing hearing. 196 It is relevant and admissible to show that a
convicted defendant deserves a more severe punishment because
the defendant's history indicates he is likely to commit future
crimes. 197 It is as difficult to imagine a sentencing hearing without
propensity and character evidence as it is to conceive of a trial
where a defendant is alleged to be guilty based solely on unrelated
past conduct or the quality of his character.
The Supreme Court has been careful to exclude unnecessary
prejudicial information when it might taint a jury verdict. 198 This
rule goes back to common law 199 and has been incorporated into
due process protections in the Constitution. 20o However, at sen
tencing, prior crimes need only be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence,201 including offenses that previously resulted in
192. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 725 (1998) (upholding California "three
strikes" law).
193. United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (deciding en
hancement for prior crime did not need to be severed).
194. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92
(1998).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (character not admissible to prove action in
conformity therewith, unless first raised by the accused).
196. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949, 951 (1983) (allowing defendant's racial
hatred to be considered); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982) (defen
dant's youth is a consideration); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949)
(defendant's background generally may be considered).
197. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1994) (future dangerous
ness is admissible).
198. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997) (identity of prior
felony excluded).
199. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
200. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1998).
201. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748 (1994) (noting that prior criminal
acts need only be proven by preponderance of evidence to be used to enhance
sentence).
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acquittals. 202
At a capital sentencing hearing, the examination of a defen
dant's character is even more complex. Psychiatric evidence that
the defendant will commit future crimes is admissible. 203 Lay wit
ness testimony of future dangerousness is also admissible. 204 Even
the defendant's "low rehabilitative potential" may be introduced. 205
Such evidence would never be admitted during the guilt phase
of a tria1. 206 Beyond the obvious notion of unfair prejudice, predic
tions of future behavior are simply not relevant to any element of a
criminal offense. 207 Thus, it is not probative to any issue of guilt. 20B
3.

Victim Impact Information

There are instances where the effect upon a victim is relevant
to proving offense elements. 209 For instance, bodily injury or finan
cialloss may be elements of an offense. However, evidence regard
ing the impact of the crime on third persons is never relevant at the
guilt stage of trial.2 l0 Defense counsel has even been found to be
ineffective for failure to object to the admission of such victim im
pact evidence during a trial.2 11
At a capital sentencing hearing, it is common to introduce in
formation about the effect of the victim's loss upon others.212 Sur
viving family members have been allowed to read poems of "deep
202. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding acquitted conduct
is admissible at sentencing).
203. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 272-73 (1976).
204. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 355-56 (1993) (numerous witnesses testi
fied to defendant's previous acts of violence).
205. United States v. Spivey, 958 F.Supp. 1523, 1535 (D. N.M. 1997); see also
EIGHTH CIRCUIT MODEL DEATH PENALTY JURY INSTRUcnONS 12.08 (Nonstatutory
Aggravating Factors) (2003).
206. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994) ("jury is not free to
convict a defendant simply because he poses a future danger").
207. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,689 (1988) (noting extrinsic acts
reflecting upon an actor's character are generally prohibited).
208. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,181-82 (1997) (deciding identity of
prior felony was unfairly prejudicial at trial).
209. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 (1999) (proof of death or
serious bodily injury).
210. See United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 989 (1994) (error to admit victims' testimony about harm to their health and
savings during trial).
211. Sager V. Maass, 907 F.Supp 1412, 1421 (D. Or. 1995), affd, 84 F.3d 1212 (9th
Cir. 1996).
212. Jones, 527 U.S. at 401 (victim impact may be relevant in every capital sen
tencing hearing).
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sadness and regret."213 In the Oklahoma City bombing trial, the
government presented evidence of family members' last contacts
with the deceased victims, the trauma of efforts to discover the vic
tims' fates, the impact on learning of their deaths, the histories of
the victims, the innocence of child victims, and the overall impact
on the surviving families. 214 Evidence of the victims' religious activ
ities has also been permitted. 215
Showing the potential effect on prison employees, who will be
responsible for the defendant, has been allowed. 216 The latent risk
to others from a capital defendant's actions is a proper basis to con
sider imposing the death penalty.217
4.

Hearsay

A further difference between proving guilt and determining
punishment is the use of hearsay evidence. Subject to limited excep
tions, hearsay is not allowed to prove a defendant's guilt at a
trial,218 Hearsay is another example of limited admissibility evi
dence. 219 A hearing that allows hearsay is entirely different in na
ture from a trial that requires the declarant to testify, subject to
limited exceptions. 22o It is unclear whether the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment even applies to the sentencing. 221
213. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 818 (4th Cir. 2000) (victim impact
reviewed only for bias and caprice).
214. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The devas
tating effects that the deaths of the victims had on their families and loved ones is
'certainly part and parcel of the circumstances' of the crime properly presented to the
jury at the penalty phase of trial.").
215. United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 479-80 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because
religion played a vital role in Todd and Stacie Bagleys' lives, it would be impossible to
describe their 'uniqueness as individual human beings' without reference to their
faith.").
216. Q. If the jury were to impose the death penalty in this case, do you have
an opinion about what impact that would have on ... the operation of USP
Atlanta in terms of the staff and security issues that you have there? A. [Of
ficer Hawkins] I believe that this would send a very clear signal to the inmates
and staff members as well that you cannot commit this type of infraction. You
cannot kill a staff member and just absolutely nothing be done about it.
United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1999).
217. Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230,232 (1983) (defendant "knowingly created a
great risk of death to many persons").
218. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1976) (holding informant's hear
say statement was not admissible to support conviction).
219. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 802 ("Hearsay Rule").
220. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1999) (contrasting trial and sen
tencing procedures).
221. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th. Cir. 2003).
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If it does, then a great deal of traditional sentencing evidence would

be barred. 222
A sentencing hearing is a procedure that gives the jury or judge
complete information about a defendant and the effect of the crime
for which the defendant has been convicted. 223 Hearsay is admissi
ble and welcome during sentencing hearings,224 Presentence re
ports, police reports, out-of-court witness statements, and other
second-hand information is regularly admitted at a sentencing
hearing.225
5.

Application of Rules

A good example of a pre-Ring case examining the application
of the rules of evidence to a capital sentencing hearing is United
States v. Pitera. 226 In Pitera, the district court rejected the applica
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence during a capital sentencing
hearing, finding that the rules only applied to proof at the guilt
phase. 227 Pursuant to Walton, that was the proper ruling in 1992.228
Proof of statutory aggravating factors were not considered to be
elements of a capital case and therefore, did not have the protection
of the rules of evidence. It was not until Ring that it became clear
that capital elements and traditional sentencing considerations were
unhappily married in one proceeding.229 Today, the same reasoning
222. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004) (Confrontation
Clause bars statements by unavailable witnesses who were not previously subject to
cross-examination).
223. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
224. Id. at 251.
225. Id. at 249-50.
226. 795 F. Supp. 546, 564-65 (E.D. N.Y. 1992).
The Federal Rules of Evidence are critical to the conduct of criminal trials to
enable "truth [to] be ascertained and proceedings [to be] justly determined."
But the focus of a trial is singular: "whether a defendant is guilty of having
engaged in criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused." ... An
individualized consideration of sentence, by contrast, necessitates a broader
inquiry into all aspects of the defendant's life and the crime committed. A
simple example best illustrates why the concerns of the two proceedings are
not best served by the Federal Rules of Evidence. At trial, a jury generally
cannot consider evidence of a defendant's past criminal conduct in deciding
whether he has committed the charged offense. That precise evidence is, how
ever, deemed highly probative at sentencing.
Id. (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 565-66.
228. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
229. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (overruling Walton).
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in Pitera - that only elements of the crime require the rules of evi
dence - produces an opposite conclusion.
If the rules of evidence apply to trials but not sentencing hear
ings, then the important issue is whether the determination of capi
tal elements is properly part of a trial or part of a sentencing
hearing. The definition does not depend merely upon what the leg
islature chose to call the proceeding.230 As with the definitions of
elements and sentencing factors, their meaning depends upon their
effect.231 The determination of elements is logically a part of the
guilt phase of triaP2 and requires the rules of a trial. To para
phrase Justice Scalia, whether it is called a trial, a sentencing hear
ing "or Mary Jane,"233 if the effect is to prove elements of the
offense, trial protections should apply.
An argument exists here because no particular set of rules of
evidence is constitutionally required. There is no right to proceed
under any specific set of rules. 234 However, this contention misses
the point. To exclude capital elements from the rules that apply to
all other criminal trials denies due process of law and has no histori
cal basis. To do so would also contradict all of the Supreme Court's
previous Eighth Amendment case law requiring greater reliability
in capital cases. 235
6.

Reliability of Judicial Discretion

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court found that
statements from an unavailable witness, offered against a criminal
defendant, without a previous opportunity for cross examination,
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 236 The
Court rejected the admission of such testimonial evidence, even if a
judge has deemed it reliable. 237
230. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 454, 550 (2002) (stating that legislatures
may not merely label every fact a sentencing factor).
231. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000) (meaning depends upon
whether effect is to raise maximum punishment).
232. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 55 (1996) (holding that rules of evi
dence may exclude some defense evidence without violating due process).
235. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("We have recognized on
more than one occasion that the Constitution places special constraints on the proce
dures used to convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death. The
finality of the death penalty requires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is im
posed. ") (citations omitted).
236. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004).
237. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at
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In doing so, the Court examined the historical basis for the
Confrontation Clause and the abuses it sought to avoid. As an ex
ample, the Court pointed to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in
1603.238 He was convicted upon a letter read by the prosecutor to
the jury. In A History of English Law, W. S. Holdsworth examined
Raleigh's trial and stated:
It is clear that this new fashion of examining witnesses for the

crown, and, in light of their depositions, elaborately preparing
the case against the prisoner, enormously increased the severity
of the rules which refused him a copy of the indictment, refused
him professional advice, and refused to allow him to call wit
nesses. And these advantages possessed by the crown pressed all
the more hardly on him, because, as we have seen, the modern
rules of evidence hardly as yet existed. 239

Rules of evidence protect criminal defendants, who would oth
erwise be left to the discretion of the trial judge. As the Supreme
Court stated in Crawford:
We have no doubt the courts below were acting in utmost good
faith when they found reliability. The Framers, however, would
not have been content to indulge this assumption. They knew
that judges, like other government officers, could not always be
trusted to safeguard the rights of the people; the likes of the
dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too distant a memory. They
were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands. 24o

Simply leaving the admission of evidence to a trial judge's
sense of reliability offends the very reason why the rules of evi
dence were developed. If a defendant has the right to have the ele
ments proven, subject to the rules of evidence and the presumption
of innocence, then this right cannot be avoided simply by placing
the proof of some elements during a sentencing hearing.
B.

Unitary Proceeding
Unlike anywhere else

III

criminal law, many death penalty

odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is
to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive
guarantee. It commands, not that the evidence be reliable, but that reliability
be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross
examination.
Id. at 1370.
238. Id. at 1360.
239. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 150, at 228.
240.. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1373.
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schemes combine trial and sentencing evidence in a single proceed
ing.241 A jury hears all the evidence at once and decides the issues
during one deliberation. 242 No distinction is made between the evi
dence offered to prove the capital elements and information of
fered regarding the appropriate punishment. 243
The Supreme Court has previously recognized that proof of
guilt and the determination of punishment in capital cases should
be separate:
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have infor
mation prejudicial to the question of guilt but relevant to the
question of penalty in order to impose a rational sentence, a bi
furcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the consti
tutional deficiencies identified in Furman [v. Georgia ].244

Since legislatures voluntarily created bifurcated capital
schemes, the Court never had to decide whether a unitary capital
trial and sentencing hearing could satisfy Furman. However, be
cause the jury's decision at the sentencing hearing is now the
equivalent to a guilty verdict of capital murder, a valid segregation
of guilt and punishment evidence is necessary.245
In other contexts, problems of prejudice are often addressed by
limiting instructions. 246 However, limiting instructions given during
a capital sentencing hearing will not work. The jury will hear all the
sentencing evidence at one proceeding. The jury cannot receive ev
idence about punishment and then mentally put it aside while they
consider proof of the capital elements. 247 A limiting instruction
that requires a jury to view a defendant as innocent with respect to
some factual findings, but guilty as to others, requires overcoming a
241. See supra note 20.
242. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373,385 (1999) (describing federal capital
procedures).
243. Id. at 386; see also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 609 (2002) (holding
that a fact increasing the minimum penalty without exceeding the maximum penalty
was appropriately found as a sentencing element by a judge rather than an offense
element to be determined by the jury).
244. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,191-92 (1976) (explaining reasoning for bi
furcated capital trials).
245. Dissenting in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2546 (2004), Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the rule prohibiting character evidence during the guilt
phase of a trial might now require legislatures to bifurcate non-capital trials, when a
defendant's prior acts will increase the sentence. Id.
246. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 ("Limited Admissibility").
247. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,131 (1968) (quoting People v. Aranda,
63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29 (1965» (finding jurors cannot merely ignore prejudicial
information).
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level of cognitive dissonance tolerated nowhere else in jury trials.2 48
In Jackson v. Denno, the Supreme Court struck down a state
court procedure, which submitted the issue of the voluntariness of a
confession to a trial jury.249 Under the procedure, if a jury found
the confession was involuntary, the jurors were then expected to
ignore the statement while deliberating about the defendant's
guilt. 250 The Court found this untenable. 251 Jurors are simply not
capable of ignoring such obviously damaging evidence. Not only
would the procedure merely mask the unfair prejUdice to the defen
dant,252 it would be impossible to present the issue on appeal be
cause there would be no way to measure if jurors improperly relied
on the statement in order to convict. 253
The procedure in Denno is analogous to the situation faced by
juries in many capital procedures. At a capital sentencing hearing,
the jury is given evidence regarding offense elements and informa
tion supporting punishment. 254 When jurors deliberate on those is
sues at the same time, they cannot be expected to disregard the
punishment information while deciding guilt.
In Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court found that it
was insufficient to instruct a jury to limit its consideration of a con
fession to only one of two defendants when the statement incrimi
nated both.255 The statement in Bruton was an admission by one
248. See id. at 135 (limiting instruction cannot cure all prejudice).
249. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 396 (1964).
250. Id. at 374-75.
251. Due process of law requires that a coerced confession be excluded from
consideration by the jury. It also requires that the issue of coercion be tried by
an unprejudiced trier, and, regardless of the pious fictions indulged by the
courts, it is useless to contend that a juror who has heard the confession can be
uninfluenced by his opinion as to the truth or falsity of it.
Id. at 383-84 n.lO.
252. It is impossible to discover whether the jury found the confession volun
tary and relied upon it, or involuntary and supposedly ignored it. Nor is there
any indication of how the jury resolved disputes in the evidence concerning
the critical facts underlying the coercion issue. Indeed, there is nothing to
show that these matters were resolved at all, one way or the other.
Id. at 379-80.
253. Id. at 380 ("Being cloaked by the general verdict, petitioners do not know
what result they really are attacking here.") (quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156,
177-78 (1953».
254. See supra note 20.
255. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-37 (1968) ("[T]he risk that the
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored.").
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defendant but hearsay as to the other. 256 It met no exception to the
rule against hearsay. If the latter defendant had been tried alone
there was no question the statement would have been excluded. 257
The Court found that the government could not benefit by their
joint trial in order to use otherwise inadmissible evidence. 258
Rather than teing told to completely disregard prejudicial evi
dence, capital jurors would be expected to make use of the informa
tion, but only for the limited purpose of selecting the
punishment. 259 In Bruton, this type of mental exercise was found to
be impossible. The remedy in Bruton was to conduct separate tri
als. 260 In capital cases, the remedy is to separate proof of guilt from
proof supporting punishment. No limiting instruction can correct
that structural defect.261
Courts have often relied on statements of common sense to
condemn such procedures: "one 'cannot unring a bell'; 'after the
thrust of the saber it is difficult to say forget the wound'; and .. .'if
you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not
to smell it."'262 As the Supreme Court quoted one juror, "You can't
forget what you hear and see."263
Individual judges have stated the problem in their own words.
Justice Robert Jackson said, "The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."264 Judge Learned Hand
stated that the limiting instruction is a "recommendation to the jury
of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but
anybody's else. "265
Social science has confirmed the validity of these sayings. Ju
rors view a trial as a cohesive story, not a collection of separate
256. Id. at 126 n.2.
257. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22-23 (1976) (stating unreliable hearsay
may not be basis for a criminal conviction).
258. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137 (reversed for new trial).
259. Id. at 131 ("A jury cannot segregate evidence into separate intellectual
boxes.") (quoting People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 528-29 (1965».
260. Id. at 137 (prejudice could not be cured by limiting instruction).
261. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 336 (1985) (finding jury must not
be misled regarding the role it plays at capital sentencing).
262. Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 885-86 (5th Cir. 1962) (prosecutor's
opening statement claimed the case was the most flagrant fraud ever in district).
263. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (stating jury should not have a
preconceived notion of the defendant's gUilt).
264. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur
ring) (admission of hearsay statements voided conviction).
265. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
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issues. 266 A court may tell a jury to limit what it considers, but once
that information has been heard, each juror will weigh the informa
tion anyway to resolve the issues. 267
A procedure may involve "such a probability that prejudice
will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process."268
Other than outside influences, like publicity,269 some trial practices
have been held to deny due process.
In Turner v. Louisiana, the two principal witnesses for the
prosecution in a death penalty case were deputy sheriffs responsible
for sequestering the jury.270 Even though there was no showing
that either deputy discussed the case in the jurors' presence,
prejudice was presumed. 271 Actions by judges272 and prosecutors273
266. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234-35 (1978); see also W. LANCE
BENNETI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM:
JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 149 (1981) ("Instead of viewing the
trial as a black box in which any number of separate factors operate in mysterious ways,
the story perspective shows how those factors enter the judgment process and how they
can operate together to affect trial outcomes.").
267. Our theory shows how ordinary means of telling and interpreting stories
are used in trials to assess the credibility of competing claims. This perspective
views the formal rules of the court as ritual that facilitates the presentation of
a case but does not dictate its interpretation. In other words, the formal pro
cedures limit the information that will be perceived as relevant to a story, but
within the range of admissible information, the actual presentation and inter
pretation of cases depend primarily on the storytelling and storyhearing abili
ties of the courtroom actors (i.e., judge, jurors, defense, prosecutor, witnesses).
The use of stories to reconstruct the evidence in cases casts doubt on the com
mon belief about justice as a mechanical and objective process.
BENNETI & FELDMAN, supra note 266, at ix.
268. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,542-43 (1965) (live radio and televised proceed
ings required reversal even absent a showing of actual prejudice); see also Tumey v.
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man ... to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the
State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
Id.
269. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1966) (jurors exposed to
publicity of defendant's character and prior acts); Estes, 381 U.S. at 542-43 (national
publicity); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 725 (1963) (film of defendant's confession
was broadcast pretrial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1961) (publicity revealed
defendant's criminal history and confession).
270. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965) ("The failure to accord an
accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.").
271. Id. at 472-74 ("The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the
evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced
in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.").
272. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 134-39 (1955) (holding violation of due
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have also been held to be inherently prejudicial when it was obvi
ous they could not be ignored.
Additionally, whenever a capital defendant presents mitigating
evidence, the government may rebut that evidence. 274 That rebut
tal evidence will also be considered by the jury at the same time it
considers the capital elements and the non-statutory aggravating
evidence. 275 There is no separation, nor can there be, in a single
proceeding. Therefore, anytime a capital defendant puts on miti
gating evidence there is not only a risk of facing rebuttal evidence,
which is not subject to the restrictions of the rules of evidence, but
that the rebuttal evidence may also influence the jury to convict on
the capital elements.
Courts do have some experience limiting the effects of prejudi
cial evidence. 276 Even absent rules of evidence, judges may still ex
clude prejudicial evidence. 277 The question is whether it is possible
for courts to allow the introduction of traditional sentencing evi
dence and still protect capital defendants from the type of prejudi
cial information prohibited at trial.
It is difficult to imagine how an effective instruction, cautioning
against combining proof of guilt with the determination of sentence,
could be worded. Capital jury instructions do not prescribe which
evidence goes with which issues, nor can they.278 The prosecution's
first witness might be a family member of the victim, whose testi
mony only concerns how much the victim meant to her, or the pros
ecution's first witness might be a government-retained psychiatrist
offering the opinion that the defendant is likely to commit future
acts of violence. The first witness might be a police officer detailing
the defendant's prior arrests and other bad conduct.
In many cases, a prosecutor will present no new evidence, rele
vant to the capital elements, at the sentencing hearing. In those
cases, nothing but punishment information will be introduced.
process when judge acted as judge in grand jury and trial judge during contempt
prosecution).
273. United States v. Shoupe, 548 F.2d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 1977) (prosecutor intro
duced witness's disavowed, unsworn prior statements to impeach his claimed lack of
memory).
274. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 105 ("Limited Admissibility").
277. See, e.g., 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c) (2001) ("[s]pecial hearing to determine whether
a sentence of death is justified").
278. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 199 (1998) (error in instructions
must be evaluated in context of the entire instructions).
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Thus, none of the proof at the sentencing hearing will be relevant to
the capital elements. The jury may have to sit through entirely ir
relevant and prejudicial information before deciding whether the
defendant is even guilty of capital murder.
C.

Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of American
law. 279 That presumption "is the undoubted law, axiomatic and ele
mentary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the adminis
tration of our criminallaw."28o A jury instruction that undermines
the presumption of innocence is unconstitutional. 281
No presumption of innocence exists at a sentencing hearing. 282
By definition, defendants may only be sentenced after guilt is deter
mined. Sentencing considerations which are not elements are thus
not subject to the Constitution's indictment, jury and proof
requirements. 283
A jury can hardly presume a defendant is innocent of capital
murder after the jurors have already deliberated and convicted the
defendant of murder. This contradiction is compounded by the fact
that the proceeding during which this will occur is called a "sentenc
ing hearing."284 This means that unlike any other crime, a capital
defendant is without the presumption of innocence as to elements
of the offense. 285 The elements in question are the very ones that
279. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of inno
cence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial
under our system of criminal justice.").
280. [T]here can be no question that the Roman law was pervaded with the
results of this maxim of criminal administration, as the following extracts
show: "Let all accusers understand that they are not to prefer charges unless
they can be proven by proper witnesses or by conclusive documents, or by
circumstantial evidence which amounts to indubitable proof and is clearer
than day."
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-54 (1895).
281. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1979) (a conclusive pre
sumption in this case "would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence
with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the
crime") (quoting Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75(1952».
282. Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278-79 (1993) (per curiam) ("Once the defen
dant has been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of inno
cence disappears.").
283. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,554-58 (2002) (not all sentencing fac
tors are elements).
284. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376 (1999).
285. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-99 (1993) (explaining presumption
of innocence and constitutional protections attach when crime is charged).
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make it a capital case. 286
In Taylor v. Kentucky, the defendant was convicted of rob
bery.287 At trial, he testified that he was not present at the victim's
home at the time of the robbery.288 Although the trial court gave
an instruction on reasonable doubt, the defendant's requested in
struction on the presumption of innocence was denied. 289 The Su
preme Court found that failure to give an instruction on the
presumption of innocence denied the defendant due process of
law. 290 In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed aspects of
the trial that vitiated against the presumption of innocence: the
prosecutor's argument condemning all defendants, the skeletal rea
sonable doubt instruction, and the swearing match between victim
and defendant,291
Proving capital elements during the sentencing hearing is
worse than the denial of a jury instruction in Taylor. Not only is a
capital defendant without the presumption of innocence, but the
jury is told the defendant is guilty.292 No instruction on reasonable
doubt can possibly remedy that defect. Even if instructions on the
presumption of innocence were given regarding the capital ele
ments, they could not logically overcome the fact that the jury has
already found the defendant guilty of a murder, or that evidence of
capital murder is then combined with information supporting a
death sentence. 293
In Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that as long as a
criminal defendant files a timely objection the defendant cannot be
compelled to stand trial in prison clothing. 294 The Court recognized
that guilt must be established by probative evidence and not as
286. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (finding murder is a
lesser included crime of capital murder).
287. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (due process requires that the
presumption of innocence be honored).
288. Id. at 480.
289. Id. at 480-81.
290. Id. at 490.
291. Id. at 486-87.
292. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COMMITIEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCfIONS FOR THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INsTRucnoNS FOR THE DIS·
TRICf COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CiRCUIT, 12.01 (2003) [hereinafter EIGHTH CiRCUIT
MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INsTRucnoNS] ("Members of the jury, you have unani
mously found the defendant guilty of the offense as charged in Count [repeat for each
offense] of the indictment. ").
293. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979).
294. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("To implement the presump
tion, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding
process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against
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sumed by the defendant's status. 295 At a sentencing hearing, where
capital elements are proven, jurors are actually told that the defen
dant is guilty of the murder before they even decide the elements of
capital murder. 296
In Beck v. Alabama, the death penalty statute prohibited ju
rors from considering imposing a conviction for a crime less than
capital murder. 297 The Court found that the unavailability of a
lesser charge created an unwarranted risk of conviction for capital
murder. 298 In other words, it was unfair to ask jurors to overcome
their natural tendency to convict when faced with the alternative of
letting a person they believed to be guilty of a lesser offense go free.
Under the procedures that resolve capital elements at a sen
tencing hearing, jurors are similarly led toward conviction. They
begin with the knowledge that the defendant has already been con
victed of the murder and must then resolve the capital elements
while also deciding punishment. 299 This comes dangerously close to
creating a presumption in favor of guilt regarding the capital
elements. 30o
The importance of those elements is diminished by their place
ment during the sentencing hearing. Instead of determining guilt of
capital murder independently, the jury may balance that decision
against the potential sentence. In other words, they may convict
the defendant of capital murder knowing that they will simultane
ously balance that with a life verdict. More ominously, they might
convict a defendant merely because they know those findings must
be made in order to also impose a death sentence.
dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond
a reasonable doubt.") (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970».
295. Id. at 504-05.
296. See, e.g., EIGHTI-I CiRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 291, at 12.0l.
297. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 628-29 n.3 (1980) (holding that due process
requires charge on lesser offense).
298. In the final analysis the difficulty with the Alabama statute is that it in
terjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding process, diverting the
jury's attention from the central issue of whether the State has satisfied its
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a
capital crime.
Id. at 642.
299. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 386 n.7 (1999) (describing federal capi
tal sentencing procedures).
300. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463,467 (1943) (holding that due process
bars a presumption in favor of an element of the prosecution's case); McFarland v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) ("[I]t is not within the province of
a legislature to declare an individual gUilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.").
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The presumption of innocence is further confused by the de
fendant's burden at the punishment hearing. While the government
must prove aggravating circumstances, a defendant has the burden
of proving mitigating circumstances. 30 } Even if the standard is only
a preponderance of evidence and a jury need not be unanimous in
finding mitigating evidence, the fact that a defendant has some bur
den of proof will prevent the jury from applying a presumption of
innocence to the capital elements.
VI.

THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT

The Federal Death Penalty Act (hereinafter "FDPA") is an ex
ample of a scheme in direct conflict with the premise that statutory
aggravating circumstances must be treated as capital elements. 302
The FDPA is a sentencing statute under which certain enumerated
federal crimes are eligible for capital punishment. 303 The FDPA re
quires a separate punishment hearing where a jury must determine
beyond a reasonable doubt (1) whether a defendant had the requi
site culpable mental state for capital murder 304 and (2) whether
there existed at least one statutory aggravating factor. 305 Only then
is the jury allowed to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors to
determine punishment. 306
The effect of the statute is that a defendant is not eligible for
the federal death penalty until a jury has found, beyond a reasona
ble doubt, the culpable mental state and at least one statutory ag
gravating factor. 307 Both of those findings are elements of federal
capital murder. 308
The statute dispenses with the rules of evidence at the sentenc
ing hearing. 309 Section 3593(c) expressly contradicts any effort to
reconcile the sentencing hearing admissibility standard with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, by stating unequivocally that in this
hearing, "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal tri
301. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c) (2000).
302. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3591-3598 (2000); see also 21 U.S.c. §§ 848(a)-(r) (2000).
303. 18 U.S.c. § 3592 (2000).
304. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 493 (2000) ("The defendant's intent in
committing a crime is perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal
offense element.") (quotations omitted).
305. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(d).
306. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1999).
307. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
308. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003).
309. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(c).
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als."310 Thus, in the statute no presumption of innocence is contem
plated. The very first sentence of the FDPA states, "[a] defendant
who has been found guilty of ...."311 Therefore, the FDPA explic
itly prohibits a defendant from receiving the protections of the rules
of evidence and the presumption of innocence regarding capital
elements.
Congress could not have intended that proof of guilt and pun
ishment be commingled. Congress created this complex sentencing
procedure at a time when Walton indicated that aggravating factors
were merely sentencing factors, not offense elements. 312 There is
nothing in the FDPA meant to affect the proof of guilt. 313 The only
procedure in the FDPA that occurs before conviction of the under
lying murder is when the Attorney General provides notice to the
defendant that the death penalty will be soughP14 The statute says
that notice requires no pleading or appearance in court. 315
Amongst other reasons, a trial is meant to protect an innocent
person from conviction. 316 On the other hand, a sentencing hearing
is used to secure an appropriate sentence for a guilty defendanP17
Both are different stages in a criminal proceeding, thus requiring
different protections and seeking different goals. The FDPA con
fuses these goals.
A.

Facial Challenges

If there is no procedure that will allow the FDPA to operate as
it is written, and no discrete portion that may be severed, then it is
unconstitutional.3 18 Only Congress has the authority to rewrite the
310.

Id.

311. 18 U.S.c. § 3591(a) (2000) (emphasis added) (preamble to FDPA).
312. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
313. 18 U.S.c. § 3591(a) ("[a] defendant who has been found guilty ....").
314. 18 U.S.c. § 3593(a) (2000) ("the attorney shall ... serve on the defendant, a
·
no t Ice.
" ") .
315.
316.

Id.
See County Court of Ulster v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979) ("[I]n criminal

cases, the ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial, based on
evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt.").
317. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376 (1999) (holding that a decision to
seek the death penalty under FDPA is in the government's discretion).
318. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55-56 n.22 (1999) ("[When]
vagueness permeates the ordinance, a facial challenge is appropriate.").
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law.319
After Ring and Sattazahn, a trial judge in a federal capital case
has a "Hobson's choice." The judge can restrict the sentencing
hearing pursuant to the rules of evidence, thereby treating the capi
tal crime elements like other elements of the charge, or alterna
tively, the judge can allow relaxed evidentiary standards at
sentencing. In the former instance, the judge will explicitly violate
the statute. 320 In the latter case, the judge will allow otherwise
inadmissible evidence to be considered in determining the capital
elements.
The problem with the FDPA is that all of the issues are intro
duced and decided together. Jurors have no idea what distinctions
there are among the various pieces of evidence they receive. There
is no reason to believe that compelling testimony about the effect
on a victim's family, or evidence of the defendant's future danger
ousness will have an adverse influence on the jury's decision to con
vict on the capital elements.
In United States v. Jackson, the Supreme Court considered
Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to a sentencing provision
that authorized the death penalty only upon a jury's recommenda
tion. 321 The Court held that the provision unconstitutionally bur
dened the rights of an accused to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and to a jury trial because a defendant could only avoid a potential
death sentence by a plea of guilty or a waiver of jury trial.3 22 To
save the death penalty portion of the statute the government pro
posed a number of alternative constructions and cited procedures
developed by other district courts as remedies for the constitutional
problems. The Supreme Court rejected each approach in favor of
legislative and not judicial action. 323
319. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-34 (1812) (stating that
federal criminal law may only be created by statute).
320. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (holding that courts have
no inherent power to circumvent rules, statutes, or the Constitution).
321. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,571 (1968) (holding the death penalty
provision of kidnapping statute unconstitutional because it made the risk of death the
price for asserting one's constitutional right to a jury trial).
322. Id. at 581.
323. For example, the government proposed a construction of the statute under
which "even if the trial judge accepts a guilty plea or approves a jury waiver, the judge
remains free ... to convene a special jury for the limited purpose of deciding whether to
recommend the death penalty." Id. at 572. The government also suggested that the
Court might save the statute by reading it to make imposition of the death penalty
discretionary on the part of the sentencing judge. Id. at 575. The Court rejected these
proposed remedies.
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In Jackson, the Court pointed out that the kidnapping statute
set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon a de
fendant who waived the right to jury trial or upon one who pleaded
guilty.324 The Court did not desire to create new rules in order to
save an unconstitutional procedure. 325
In Arizona v. Fulminante, the Supreme Court defined struc
tural error as a situation when the entire conduct of a trial is af
fected. 326 In that situation a harmless error analysis does not
apply.327 Structural error occurs when "a reviewing court can only
engage in pure speculation-its view of what a reasonable jury
would have done."328 Nothing could be more speculative than try
ing to figure out whether a jury was influenced to convict a defen
dant of capital murder based upon punishment evidence.
Regardless of what jurors are told to do, there is no way to know
whether they improperly considered punishment evidence while de
liberating about capital elements, especially after a combined hear
ing and during a single deliberation.
The placement of offense elements during a sentencing hearing
will affect the entire conduct of a trial. In jurisdictions where of
fense elements are left to the sentencing hearing, if a defendant
wants to contest the charge of capital murder, but not contest a
lesser included offense such as simple murder, the defendant must
either sit mute during the trial or plead guilty to the underlying
murder and then participate in a sentencing hearing to determine
whether he is guilty of capital murder.
This is different than any other kind of criminal trial (where
proof of guilt and punishment are completely separate) and affects
324. It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute-to extrapolate from its
general design details that were inadvertently omitted. It is quite another thing
to create from whole cloth a complex and completely novel procedure and to
thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole purpose of rescuing a statute
from a charge of unconstitutionality.
Id. at 580.
325. [d. at 580 n.17 ("It is not surprising that courts confronted with such
problems have concluded that their solution requires 'comprehensive legislative and
not piecemeal judicial action."') (quoting State v. Mount, 152 A.2d 343, 358 (N.J.
1959».
326. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,309-10 (1991) (listing examples of con
stitutional errors).
327. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1986) (holding unlawful an
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984) (the right to public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177
n.8 (1984) (the right to self-representation at trial).
328. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (holding that a deficient rea
sonable doubt instruction required reversal).
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every decision by a capital defendant, from what questions to ask
during voir dire to the substance of closing argument. Imagine a
non-capital case where an element of the crime is not considered
until after conviction. 329 It would be ridiculous but no different
than leaving capital elements to be decided at a capital sentencing
hearing.
It is impossible to know whether Congress would want to apply
the Federal Rules of Evidence to the statutory aggravating circum
stances and culpability findings alone, or whether Congress would
want to apply them to the other findings as well - such as mitigating
circumstances and non-statutory aggravating factors. 33o Applying
the Federal Rules of Evidence to mitigating proof would seriously
impinge on a defendant's Eighth Amendment right to introduce
any and all mitigating evidence. 331
Legislatures could have done what Justice Scalia suggested in
Ring: "plac[e] the aggravating-factor determination (where it logi
cally belongs anyway) in the guilt phase."332 However, Congress
chose not to. We can only assume that Congress meant to meet
constitutional requirements at the time they enacted the FDPA.333
Those requirements have now changed because of Ring. We do not
know which of these policy choices, each one fraught with practical
complexities on one side and potential constitutional problems on
the other, Congress would have chosen in light of the Court's new
approach to treating sentencing hearing findings as elements of a
capital crime.
B.

Federal Cases

Since Ring, federal courts have examined two issues regarding
the validity of the FDPA: (1) whether indictments must allege the
capital elements,334 and (2) whether the rules of evidence apply at
329. Cf Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (dispensing with jury finding
of minor element of materiality in white collar tax case was subject to harmless error
analysis).
330. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 384 (1999) ("[1]n light of congres
sional silence, we will not exercise our supervisory powers to require that an instruction
of the sort petitioner sought be given in every case.").
331. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606-07 (1978) (limiting defendants' miti
gating evidence would clearly violate the Eighth Amendment).
332. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (discussing that Congress is
assumed to legislate in light of constitutional limitations).
334. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 979 (W.D. Tenn.
2003) (the mens rea and aggravating factors must be charged by indictment).
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capital sentencing hearings. 335 The first issue has been fairly uncon
troversial. Courts have agreed that federal indictments require no
tice of the facts necessary to seek capital punishment.336 Federal
prosecutors generally concede this issue and now supercede indict
ments to allege capital elements whenever the decision is made to
seek the death penalty.337
The latter issue, the application of the rules of evidence, is hav
ing mixed responses. Only one district judge has found the FDPA
unconstitutional for failure to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence
to prove the culpable mental state and statutory aggravating fac
tOr. 338 That decision was later reversed by the Second Circuit. 339
Some judges have ordered the Federal Rules of Evidence be
applied to the government at the sentencing hearing despite the
prohibition under the FDPA.340
Other courts have assumed that evidence, which would violate
a capital defendant's constitutional rights at trial, such as evidence
prohibite~ by the Confrontation Clause, is also inadmissible at the
sentencing hearing. 341 However, there may not be authority to sup
335. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence are not constitutionally mandated per se.").
336. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (requiring indictment for offenses "punishable by
death"); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 8 (1959) (requiring indictment in capital
cases); United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir. 2003).
337. See Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (discussing capital elements added by
superceding indictment).
338. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. VI. 2002) (Sessions, J.).
But see United States v. Battle, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373-74 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (granting
certificate of appealability based on Fell).
339. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2004).
340. The Government is further advised that it may only proffer evidence that
meets the requirement of heightened reliability as reflected by, at a minimum,
the Federal Rules of Evidence both at trial and sentencing for the reasons
stated on the record. However, Mr. Bass is not bound by the Federal Rules of
Evidence or any heightened standard as it relates to the penalty phase of the
trial.
United States v. Bass, No. 97-80235 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (Tarnow, J.). See also United
States v. Denis, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("In this case, the gov
ernment has agreed not to introduce hearsay and the court will apply the strict rules of
evidence."); United States v. Mikos, No. 02-137-1, 2003 U.S. Dist. WL 22110948, at *11
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2003) (ruling that the Federal Rules of Evidence will be applied if
the case goes to a sentencing phase).
341. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 684 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(alleging that Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause concerns are protected at fed
eral capital sentencing); see also United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 265 F. Supp. 2d 181,
185 (D.P.R. 2003).
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port such a right,342 Some courts have simply found that rules of
evidence do not apply at a federal capital sentencing hearing at
all.3 43
Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, district courts are
likely to try many options; however, all appear to be flawed. Either
they violate the clear language of the statute by imposing rules of
evidence, or they violate due process by the disparate treatment of
capital elements. For example, a court could try applying the rules
of evidence to the government's proof of the capital elements.
There are at least two problems with this method. First, it violates
the plain language of the FDPA, which prohibits the rules of evi
dence at capital sentencing hearings. Second, it fails to address the
effect of other punishment evidence, inadmissible under the rules of
evidence, which would be introduced at the same hearing.
Another option might be to apply the rules of evidence to all
prosecution proof at capital sentencing hearings. That solution also
violates the plain words of the statute, but the effect would be more
dramatic. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence virtually no tradi
tional sentencing information would be admissible. There would be
little character evidence, and no proof of propensity.344 There
would be no victim impact evidence that was not relevant to an
element of the crime. 345 Hearsay would be prohibited, except for
recognized exceptions. 346 Proof of prior acts by defendants would
be limited. Therefore, very little traditional punishment evidence
would be admissible, other than the facts of the crime.
A court might "trifurcate" a capital trial. In other words, first
there would be a trial of the underlying murder. Second, if the de
fendant were convicted, there would be a trial of the additional ele
ments of capital murder. Third, if the defendant were convicted of
capital murder, there would be a sentencing hearing. The problem
with trifurcation is that it requires rewriting the FDPA. The statute
clearly approves only a very specific bifurcated procedure. 347 For a
342. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 (4th Cir. 2003) (questioning
whether Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing).
343. See United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977-79 (W.D. Tenn. 2003);
United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 924, 946 (N.D. Iowa 2003); United States v.
Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141-46 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
344. See FED. R. EVID. 404 ("Character Evidence Not Admissible To Prove
Conduct").
345. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (stating that victim impact
is relevant to gUilt when it is probative of an element of the crime).
346. See FED. R. EVID. 802-05, 807 ("Hearsay Rule" and "Hearsay Exceptions").
347. 18 U.S.c. §§ 3591-3598 (2000) (trial precedes sentencing hearing).

2004]

WHEN TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT INTERSECT

275

court to simply create a new procedure that changes the entire dy
namic of a capital trial would seem to violate the separation of pow
ers between the judicial and legislative branches of government,348
While judges have wide authority to interpret laws, they are not
entitled to write them. 349
The only issues the courts have reached are the failure of the
FDPA to require indictment of capital elements and the prohibition
against applying the Federal Rules of Evidence. All courts have
agreed that although capital elements must be indicted, the FDPA
is not invalid for only requiring written notice. 350 As to the latter
issue, one court has held the FDPA unconstitutional for its aban
donment of the rules of evidence,351 while all other courts have re
jected the claim.352
The courts that have rejected this claim do so on the basis that
the Federal Rules of Evidence are not constitutionally guaranteed
and because the Supreme Court has upheld relaxed evidentiary
procedures at capital sentencing hearings. 353 As stated earlier,
these responses are beside the point. First, there is no precedent for
treating some elements of capital murder to less exacting proof than
any other crime. Second, when the Supreme Court upheld a re
laxed evidentiary proceeding in capital cases, it was in reference to
selecting punishment and not to determining elements of an of
fense. 354 Third, that would mean that Congress can enact crimes
that are exempt from any evidentiary rules.
The one case where the FDPA was held unconstitutional for
failure to apply the Federal Rules of Evidence was United States v.
Fell. 355 In that case, the district court reasoned that capital ele
ments must be treated like any other offense element, including ap
348. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (Congress, not the
courts, make the laws).
349. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (only Congress
can create elements of a crime).
350. See Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that FDPA
does not prohibit indictment of capital elements), rev'd by, Mitchell v. Esparza, 124
S.Ct. 1124 (2004).
351. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002) (FDPA held
unconstitutional), vacated by, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
352. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142-46 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) (explaining that particular rules of evidence are not constitutionally required).
353. Id. (citing to various Supreme Court opinions).
354. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990), overruled by, Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
355. United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D.Vt. 2002).
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plication of the rules of evidence. 356 The district court stated, "In
effect, the government would approve death eligibility as the fed
eral criminal justice system's sole exception to the practice of re
quiring that offense elements be proven by admissible evidence
comporting with due process and fair trial guarantees. This makes
no sense. "357
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order striking
down the FDPA.358 The court of appeals found that the admissibil
ity standard of the FDPA, which states "that information may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creat
ing unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury,"
allowed the court to exclude evidence that violated Fell's constitu
tional rights.
In Fell, at issue was a confession taken by law enforcement of
ficers from Fell's co-defendant, Lee. 359 Lee later died. He was
never cross-examined. The government intended to use the state
ment at the sentencing hearing to prove aggravating factors alleged
in the indictment. It was undisputed that the statement was inad
missible hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 36o
The court of appeals found that since the Federal Rules of Evi
dence were not constitutionally mandated, that the FDPA standard
was a reliable substitute. The court held that the district court
might exclude the statement pursuant to the FDPA's test for unfair
prejudice. 361
One week later, the Supreme Court issued Crawford v. Wash
ington. 362 That case affected the Fell decision in two ways. First,
the Second Circuit's direction to the district court that it had discre
tion to exclude the statement based on unfair prejudice was incor
rect, since Crawford commanded that such a statement must be
excluded as a matter of constitutionallaw. 363 Second, and more im
portant, the court of appeals' premise, that a judge's decision about
the reliability of evidence can be a sufficient test for admissibility,
356. Id. at 488 ("Every crime set forth in the United States Code is defined in
terms of elements, and every element must not only be proven to a jury beyond a rea
sonable doubt, but be proven by evidence found to be reliable by application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.").
357. Id.
358. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 146 (2d Cir. 2004).
359. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
360. Id.
361. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 1374.
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was completely undermined by Crawford. 364
Prior to this decision, leaving the admissibility of evidence
completely up to a judge's discretion had never been described as
"heightened reliability." As discussed above, the history of Anglo
American law has been one of criminal jury trials in which defend
ants are protected by exclusionary rules of evidence, not merely by
the discretion of judges.
C.

Retroactivity

Retroactivity of a precedent is an issue if the ruling has
changed, not merely clarified, the law of the jurisdiction.365 A sub
stantive change in the law is generally retroactive. 366 If the change
is procedural, then analysis is necessary to see if its retroactive ap
plication is barred. 367 This analysis involves examining when the
conviction and sentence became final and finding whether the Con
stitution compelled the rule at that time. 368 If it was constitution
ally compelled, the rule is retroactive. 369 If it was not, then it must
meet one of two exceptions: (1) that it punishes "a class of defend
ants because of their status or offense;"370 or (2) that it enhances
accuracy and alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a particular conviction. 371
In Schriro v. Summerlin, the Supreme Court held that its ruling
in Ring was a procedural change that did not affect fundamental
fairness. 372 The Court found that Ring did not affect the range of
conduct subject to the death penalty under Arizona law, only the
364. Id. at 1375.
365. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001) (holding that retroactivity
analysis need not be applied to ruling by a state's highest court which merely clarified
state law).
366. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998) (allowing defendant to
rely, in his defense, on a previous substantive change in law).
367. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) ("[N]ew constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced.").
368. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156-57 (1997) (holding that change to
procedure was a new rule and not retroactive).
369. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-07.
370. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989).
371. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) ("clearly meant to apply only to
a small core of rules requiring observance of 'those procedures that ... are implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311) (quoting MacKey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937».
372. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2526-27 (2004).
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methods of its determination. 373 Since the Court could not say that
a judicial finding seriously diminishes accuracy, it was not held to be
fundamentally unfair. 374 Ring is therefore not retroactive, and is
inapplicable to cases that were final at the time.
There are two reasons why a successful challenge to the FDPA
may be retroactive. First, although applying rules of evidence is
only procedural, its effect is far more pervasive than the speculative
difference between the accuracy of a judge and a jury. It is much
easier to see why prohibiting character evidence and hearsay would
fundamentally change the nature of a proceeding.
Second, it is not merely the lack of evidentiary rules that is at
issue, but the combination of the trial of guilt and the sentencing
hearing. If it were held that those proceedings had to be separated,
that could require a change to the substantive crimes that are eligi
ble for the death penalty. Such a change would likely be
retroactive. 375
VII.

STATE CAPITAL PROCEDURES

A review of various state capital procedures indicates many
have the same problems contained in the FDPA.376 In other words,
capital elements are decided during the sentencing hearing without
rules of evidence.
Before Ring, the Supreme Court found there were two types of
capital schemes: those that narrowed the class of defendants eligible
for the death penalty at the guilt phase, and those that did so during
the sentencing phase. 377 For example, the Court found Texas to be
of the former definition before Ring. 378
A post-Ring analysis produces a different result. In Texas, cap
373. Id. at 2524.
374. Id. at 2525.
375. Id. at 2523 ("A rule is substantive rather [than] procedural if it alters the
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.") (citing Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998».
376. See supra note 20 and accompanying statutes.
377. It seems clear to us from this discussion that the narrowing function re
quired for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these
two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses,
as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to
this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and
provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the
penalty phase.
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988).
378. [d. at 245-46.
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ital jurors must answer three special issues. 379 The first concerns
the probability that the defendant will be a continuing threat by
future acts of violence. The second is whether the defendant in
tended or anticipated that human life would be taken. The third
asks the jury to consider any evidence mitigating against the death
penalty. The jury must answer affirmatively to the first two, and
negatively to the third, before a death sentence may be imposed. 380
After Ring, it would seem that the first two issues of the Texas
scheme are elements of capital murder. They require a jury to find
facts, which if proven, make a defendant eligible for the death pen
alty. Only after those facts are found, can they be weighed against
mitigating facts to decide whether the death penalty is appropriate.
In California and Washington, aggravating factors are pleaded
by indictment and tried during the guilt phase. 381 This would seem
to avoid the problems caused by mixing trial and punishment.
However, even those systems may require additional proof of ele
ments at sentencing in cases where the trial instructions fail to ad
dress whether someone convicted solely as an accomplice can be
eligible for a death sentence. 382
Maryland requires that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
factors before a death sentence may be imposed. 383 A majority of
the Maryland Supreme Court held that this requirement was not an
element of capital murder, as a defendant was eligible for a death
sentence once a single aggravating factor was established. 384 Only
Nevada has held that the weighing of factors requires jury
participation. 385
In Florida, the jury's role at a capital sentencing is advisory,
both as to eligibility and selection. 386 However, even after Ring,
Florida's highest court has found the procedure is valid. 387
Some legislatures are revising their capital statutes in light of
379. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 2003) (Texas capital sen
tencing procedure).
380. Id.
381. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060
(1981).
382. State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 734 (Wash. 2000) (reversing death sentence for
defendant who was not proven to be "major participant").
383. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g) (2003).
384. Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1157-58 (Md. 2003) (upholding death
sentence).
385. Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002).
386. FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141(2) (2002).
387. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
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Ring, but those are jurisdictions where judges had been responsible

for finding the capital elements. 388 A few state courts have re
viewed their states' capital schemes after Ring, but none have
found them invalid for combining trial and punishment
proced ures. 389
CONCLUSION

Many capital punishment schemes in the United States deter
mine whether a defendant is guilty of capital murder after a hearing
that is without the protection of a trial. Recent Supreme Court
cases put the constitutionality of those procedures in doubt.
By allowing evidence that would be inadmissible to prove guilt,
by eliminating the presumption of innocence, and by requiring a
jury to combine findings regarding elements of the crime with the
selection of punishment, such death penalty schemes violate due
process of law and the right to jury trial. There is no historical pre
cedent for such disparity. The only solution is for legislatures to
rewrite those capital statutes to require that all elements of a capital
crime be proven during the guilt phase of trial.
Although that might seem an easy remedy, there are some dif
ficult political implications. Adding new elements to existing homi
cide statutes is a substantive change. Persons whose offenses
occurred before the enactment of such new laws would not be eligi
ble for the death penalty. Even a system of trifurcation might be so
fundamental a change as to require relief for those sentenced to
death under old schemes.
Legislatures would also have to deal with issues such as
whether to include stronger protections against convicting the inno
cent, the high cost of capital punishment, and evidence of declining
support for death sentences. Such a situation would require a com
prehensive, but necessary, reexamination of capital punishment.

388. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 4209 (2002).
389. See Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004); Brice v. State, 815 A.2d
314,326-27 (Del. 2003); Nebraska v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 631-32 (Neb. 2003).

